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ABSTRACT
China has the largest housing market in the world and the property market continues to
advance at an astonishing pace. In 2009, 22.2% of China's RMB 19.3 trillion fixed asset
investment and 17.9% of foreign direct investment were invested into the real estate sector. At
the same time, the highly dynamic market structure and huge regional disparities in China
created mixed interpretation and confusion. Nationwide statistics blending urban and
suburban prices and the indifferent treatment towards subsidized housing and private housing
overshadowed the actual development on the local level. With unprecedented investment
pouring into the Chinese real estate market and sky rocketing property prices in most major
cities, the legendary short-seller James Chanos described the Chinese real estate sector as
"Dubai times 1,000 - or worse". Yet, another American financial guru Jim Rogers openly
debunked the statement from James Chanos and remained his bullish views on China.
This thesis is divided into two sections. First it reviews the historical development from
the Chinese property market. The paper explores the current situation of the market and
focuses on the affordability comparison between the national level and the local levels. On a
national level, housing prices grow at a pace similar to China's GDP growth supported by an
even faster growth in income levels. Affordability ratios are in line with international standards
and below the levels experienced by Japan and US during their bubble era. At the local level,
different cities experienced drastic differences in price growth and supply surpluses. In some
cities, even the suburban areas are beyond the affordability of an average household.
In the second section, this paper explores the development of affordable housing, the
new frontier of Chinese real estate market. The emergence of the affordable housing market
together with new housing policies has different implications and opportunities to the
incumbent property developers as well as potential low-end disruptors in China. This paper
concludes with recommendations on some of the available investment options for a bearish
investor in the Chinese real estate market.
Thesis Supervisor: Randolph B. Cohen
Title: Associate Professor of Finance
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I. Introduction
A. Historical Development
The formation of China's real estate market was started from the land reform policy
in 1949 and a redistribution of land ownership in China. Traditionally lands were owned by
the State, and the government had the ultimate right to determine its usage and any further
redistribution. Private developers and households can only occupy the land through a very
long lease. Before the economic reform in 1978, welfare housing was the predominate
housing system in China. The government and state owned enterprises (SOEs) were required
to provide basic social welfare to the employees and their families, including housing,
medical care and education.
However such social welfare system added immense financial burden on the
government and the SOEs. In addition, it created additional layers of inefficiencies and
inflexibilities in the system and there were simply no other alternatives. In 1978, the Chinese
government executed a nation-wide economic reform, which included a highly important
reform on land ownership. Ordinary people were allowed to own their property. In 1980,
the establishment of Beijing Property Development Company marked the official beginning
of the property market in China. By 1987, land use rights for property development were
sold via a public auction in Shenzhen, the first property auction to the public in China. In
1991, Shanghai was the first city to create a central provident fund system in China.
Between 1992 and 1993, other cities began to reform their housing system and the State
Council initiated the "Anju Project" to construct more affordable housing to the public.
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Figure 1.1 showed the strong increase in real estate investment in proportion to the total fixed
investment.
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Figure 1.1 Proportion of Real Estate Investment to Total Fixed Investment (1992-2007)
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, PRC
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Figure 1.2 Inflation rate in China (1992-2008)
Source: International Monetary Fund
Over investment in the Chinese real estate market together with other externalities led
to high inflation in the 1990s (Figure 1.2). Funds flowing into the real estate market became
a heavily watched sector for monitoring China's inflation. In 1997, negative growth in real
estate investment and poor economic performance in surrounding Asian economies during
the Asian financial crisis eventually tamed the high inflation era in China.
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Before 1999, most Chinese residents still relied on the free welfare housing system
provided by the government or SOEs. In March 1998, Premier Zhu Rongji announced a
series of housing reforms, including the end to traditional welfare housing system and
encouraged workers to either rent at the market price or to purchase their own properties with
a one-time government subsidy. All vacant residential units after January 1, 1999 will no
longer be allocated, but to be purchased. To complement with housing reform, Chinese
banks began to offer home mortgages to purchasers. These reforms promoted the growth of
private housing market and put an end to the historical welfare housing system in China.
Capital investment and construction in the Chinese property sector recorded tremendous
growth. At the turn of the millennium, investment in Chinese property development reached
RMB 401 billion and 410 million square meters of residential housing projects were
constructed, an increase of 10% and 19.6% respectively from the level recorded in 1998. In
2001, the Department of Housing and Real Estate of the Ministry of Construction reported
that over 80 percent of the original allocated public housing had been sold and confirmed the
official start of private housing ownership in China.
During the same period, urbanization became a major movement in China. Rising
income together with urbanization movement created strong demand for urban housing,
particularly along the coastal cities. Between 1997 and 2002, the urbanization rate in China
grown from 31.9% to 39.1% and the urban population jumped from 394.5 million to 502.1
million. Improving disposal income also created greater demand for capital investment
outlets. Historically, the two major investment channels in China were the equity market and
the real estate market. The high volatility and stock market crash in 2001 made real estate a
more attractive alternative for investment. The improvements in capital availability via bank
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mortgages and low interest rate encouraged more capital towards the Chinese property
market. In addition to traditional cultural biases toward home ownership, China witnessed
strong and stable growth in real estate investment and its proportion in the total fixed
investment starting from 2001 surpassed its historical heights in 1996.
Investment into real estate development recorded RMB 2.53 trillion in 2007, an
increase of 30.2% from 2006, and residential property attributed 71% of the total investment.
During the same period, the growth in residential projects supply was uneven and only
completed 478 million square meter of residential sites, a mere 5% increase over 2006. The
available area for sale in fact has fallen to 67.6 million square meter, a decrease of 16.6%.
With strong increase in demand but limited supply, property prices in 70 major cities
increased by 7.6%.
B. Similarities with the Chinese A-Shares Market
China has completed a total of 7.3 billion square meter of floor space over the past 5
years. While the sheer scale is truly enormous, it is important to note that only 45% of that is
commodity building and 55% of that is non-commodity building. Only commodity building
are tradable and the remaining 55% are not tradable. They are either state owned, non
transferable or simply having no price. Therefore, the supply of properties in China is highly
controlled by the State, a common phenomenon shared by the Chinese A-share market. In
2006, the non-tradable shares contributed 60% of the total market capitalization. The
Chinese A-share market was deflated as many of these previously non-tradable shares were
converted into tradable shares. The Chinese stock market began to stabilize only when a
quota was placed on the sale of the newly converted shares. The same effect can potentially
happen to the Chinese property market if there is a dramatic increase in real estate supply.
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As the non-tradable properties are largely governed by the Chinese government, the State can
have a substantial impact to the property price by tuning the supply the market.
C. Government Policies
Learning from its overheating experience in the 1990s, the government responded
proactively in 2003 to the strong surge in the real estate prices. A number of tax and
regulation policies were implemented to strengthen the government's control on property
prices. In 2006, the Chinese government announced six policies aimed to balance the supply
and demand structure of the housing sector and encouraged the development of small and
medium size properties for the mass market. However, these efforts were unable to stabilize
the housing prices and the Chinese property continued its upward trend. As a result, more
tightening policies were released in 2007 by raising the lending rates six times to increase the
borrowing cost of mortgages to 10% over the benchmark interest rate. In addition, in order
to target the speculators of the real estate market, the initial down payment requirement for
second home mortgage application increased to 40% and real estate projects required an
initial capital of 35% for loan application. In 2008, the Chinese government further increases
the supply of the property market by regulating the accumulation of land reserves among the
real estate developers. This policy encouraged quicker development of land usage. Idled
land that has been underutilized or abandoned for over two years after purchase will be
confiscated by the government without compensation. The payment schedule for auctioned
land is also severely shortened from several years to within one year. 50% of the premium is
required to pay upfront (100% in some cases) and the remaining will be paid in the next
twelve months after the auction date. The Land and Resources Bureau also investigate the
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land hoarding behavior of certain developers and once proven, it will instruct banks to stop
lending to these targeted developers.
Figure 1.3 Recent Major Policies
Feb 2011 Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Taiyuan, Ningbo, Haikou, Sanya, Xian, Wuxi announced
implementation details of purchase limit policy
Raised reserve requirement ratio by 50bps
Nanning implemented purchase limit policy
Raised interest rate by 25bps
Shanghai issued a new strict version of purchase limit policy
Jan 2011 Shanghai and Chongqing introduced property taxes.
Chongqing (0.5% on luxury homes, 1% on stand-alone homes, 1.2% on newly purchased
high-end homes)
Shanghai (0.6% tax on second homes by Shanghai resident, first home by non resident)
Oct 2010 Notice on loans from housing fund
Sep 2010 Adjustment on preferential property transaction duties and individual profits tax
May 2010 Settlement of value added tax (VAT) on land
Apr 2010 MOHURD strengthen management of economic housing
Minimum of 50% down payment on second home mortgages
Nov 2009 Released issues relating property tax and urban land use tax
National Taxation Bureau levying profit tax on individuals subletting housing units
Aug 2009 Ministry of Land and Resources: strengthen land use management and accelerate
construction on approved but idled land
Jul 2009 Collection of new construction land use fees
Source: Xinhua News
The Central Government announced the following Eight Measures on April 11, 2010
in reaction to the strong growth in housing prices:
e To hold local governments accountable for housing development and housing price
control
* To increase the construction of affordable housing
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* To implement stricter tax measures; transfer of housing bought in less than five years
will be charged at full transaction amount
* To tighten credit, 60% down payment for second time home buyers and 1.1 times
PBOC base rate is to be charged
* To monitor local land supply, 70% of the land supply is to be used for small sized
commodity housing and public housing
* To restrict home purchase of non-local residents in municipalities, provincial capital
cities and cities where housing prices have increased most rapidly
* Local governments to set targets for controlling the home prices
e To utilize media to educate people of housing consumption
D. Foreign Investment
China released provisions on foreign investment in 1995 and divided into four
categories: "encouraged", "limited", "allowed" and "forbidden". Real estate was included in
the Catalogue for Guiding the Industries Using Foreign Investment in 1997 as the "limited"
category. Foreign capital can invest via joint ventures, but not wholly owned, into the
following areas: land development, construction and operation of high-grade hotels,
commercial office buildings, villas, golf courses, and national tourist areas. In 2006,
regulations on foreign capital investment into domestic property sector were further refined
and clarified. Together with the Ministry of Commerce, the announcement specified the
approval, registration, transfer and acquisition process and the investment value, the
enterprise types and the proportion of registered assets. Regulations on foreign exchange
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account in China's property sector were also released in 2006. Policies were strengthened in
regulating foreign capital from speculating the Chinese real estate market and the funds in
local FX account were banned from domestic property investment. As a result, foreign
capital investment in domestic real estate market is USD 17.1 billion, attributed merely 4.7%
of the total investment in real estate, representing slightly above one-fifth of the total foreign
investment capital. Yet, more than 300 joint ventures with foreign investments were created
in 2007 to participate in the Chinese local property market.
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11. Current Situation
In response to one of the worst global financial crisis in 2008, China implemented an
aggressive RMB 4.0 trillion (US$586 billion) stimulus package on November 10, 2008.
Between November 2008 and April 2010, a total of RMB 13.7 trillion (USD 2.0 trillion) was
injected into the economy. The lack of full convertibility of Reminbi made most of the spillover
internalized within China. Liquidity flooded into the only three channels - stock market, real
estate market, and bank deposit. Approximately RMB 6 trillion are still within the banking
deposit with RMB 4 trillion invested in infrastructure projects. While the remaining 25% of
liquidity is unclear, and many believed it entered the real estate market in China. Between 2008
and 2010, the housing price released by the National Development and Reform Commission
confirmed an annual double digit growth across 70 major cities in China (Figure 2.1).
Aug-09 Feb-10 Aug-10
Figure 2.1 Housing Price Growth in 70 Major Cities in China
Source: National Development and Reform Commission, Bloomberg
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A. Comparison with Japan and US
Comparison with Japan
Okina et al (2001) defined the Japanese "bubble period" between 1987 and 1990 with the
following four clear characteristics:
* Marked increase in asset price
" Expansion in monetary aggregates and credit (low interest rate for an extended period of
time)
e Overheating economy
e Stable CPI inflation in parallel with the expansion of asset prices and a long adjustment
period after the peaking of asset prices
Japan had strong economic fundamentals in the 1980s. The yen was appreciating on
the back of large trade surplus and the banking system was deregulated and began to lend
aggressively. The tax system and regulations was favorable towards accelerating the rise in
land prices. The era was characterized by overconfidence and euphoria that asset prices in
Japan will continue to rise forever. There was also an overconcentration of economic
functions in Tokyo, the only dominant center in Japan.
Comparison with US
After the dot-com crisis at the turn of the millennium, US maintained a very low
interest rate environment for an extended period of time. We have witnessed a sharp increase
in loose lending practice and large amount of subprime and questionable loans made at
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beginning of 2006. Subprime loans became very widespread and one in every five
mortgages is a subprime mortgage.
The comparison with the bubble period experienced in Japan and US showed China
indeed shared some similarities and differences. While China experienced both a sharp
increase in asset price and an expansion in monetary easing, whether the economy is
overheated or not is still controversial. There is no poor lending practice that was penetrated
into the mass market as witnessed in Japan and US and the leverage level is low. Therefore,
China exhibited some unique properties that we cannot claim it fits the characteristics of the
bubble period experienced by Japan or US. The table below summarizes the similarities and
differences between China and Japan and US across various areas (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Similarities and Differences between China and Japan & US
Asset prices Sharp increase in property Bubble in both Bubble largely
prices in a number of tier I residential and concentrated on housing
cities commercial markets
Investment Real estate is believed to be Price will continue to Price will continue to go
mentality one of the most profitable go up. Can always sell up. Can always sell at a
and least volatile asset class at a higher price higher price
Bank lending The government loosen its All banks rushed into Originated large amount
monetary policies via large mortgage lending of poor quality loans,
amount of bank lending strong penetration by
non-bank lenders
Real Estate 30% down payment for first No checks on No checks on borrowers
Purchase home, 40% for second borrowers
Regulations home. Banned third home
purchase. Mortgage
payment less than 50% of
income
Mortgage Rate No teaser rates Teaser rates on some Teaser rates on some
mortgage mortgage
Monetary Policy Implement stimulus plans Lower interest rate Low interest rate for an
via banks. Liquidity flood from 5.0% to 2.5% to extended period of time
the equity & property avoid strong yen. after dot-coi crisis
market, whilst 60% of all Capital flooded the
lending redeposit in the asset market
bank system
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B. What is a bubble
There is no official definition of a real estate bubble. American economist Robert
Shiller interpret as "a bubble occurs when exaggerated expectations of future prices increase
unusual demand either by people who fear being priced out of a market or by investors
hoping to make a lot of money fast. A bubble is a self-fulfilling prophecy for a while, as
successive rounds of buyers push prices higher and higher. But the willingness to pay higher
and higher prices in fragile: It will end whenever buyers perceive that prices are no longer
going up. Hence bubbles carry the seeds of their own destruction. Only time is needed for
bubbles to end." The definition according to Stiglitz (1990) is "there exists a bubble if house
prices are high today because of market participators expect that house prices are higher
tomorrow and if the fundamental value at the same time cannot justify such price." Both
definitions shared the common ground of the following elements:
1) Rapid increase in property valuation chased by unusual demand and expectations
2) Elements of speculation behavior
3) Unsustainable level of valuation relative to income and other economic indicators
4) An eventual decline
Due to the reason that the last element of the definition has still not been witnessed,
this paper analyzes the arguments and the counter arguments of both sides in determining
whether the current situation would fit the definition of a real estate bubble.
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C. National Level
The affordability ratio (housing price divided by household income) on a national
level in China is 6.9x, which is similar to other international level such as 7. 1x in London and
7.0x in New York. Supply/demand ratios and investment capital flow on a national level
suggest mix arguments on speculating whether the Chinese residential property market is a
bubble or not. National numbers are too high level and can subject to a number of mix
interpretations. The following summarizes the arguments of both sides.
Arguments for it is bubble
1) Unprecedented volumes of investment
The exponential growth in loan growth and M2 growth created unprecedented
volumes of investments into the Chinese real estate market. As of Dec 2010, M2 already
reached RMB 72.6 trillion, an increase of 19.7% from last year, and new loan has
reached RMB 9,590 billion and RMB 7,950 billion in 2009 and 2010 respectively. This
excess liquidity is one of the major factors contributing to the strong growth in housing
prices. While the historical correlation between M2 and real estate prices has been low, it
was greatly increased after the Chinese government implemented its monetary policy in
stimulating the economy and M2 growth became an important indicator of the real estate
price movement. Figure 2.3 shows the recent trend and correlation between property
prices and M2 growth. The support for property price growth will be reduced as growth
in money supply gradually reverts to historical levels.
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Figure 2.3 Money Supply (M2) and Property Prices
Source: Bloomberg, National Development and Reform Commission
2) Supply outpaced demand
The total amount of housing new starts between 4Q2009 and 3Q 2010 is 1.28
billion square meter. Given pre sale normally start after 3 - 9 months after construction
starts, it translates into approximately 0.8 billion - 1.0 billion square meter of new supply
in 2011. In addition to the 2011 construction starts that could be launched, according to
Morgan Stanley estimates, the residential property supply is expected to increase 38% in
2010 and 23% in 2011. This is equivalent to a total of 1.23 billion square meters of
residential area by 2011. In fact, nearly every region in China already witnessed over 50%
increase in new construction started in 2010 and portion of that will be converted into
new supply in 2011.
The excessive supply is further exacerbated by the acceleration in developing idle
lands. Between 1999 and 2009, there are 3.45 billion square meter of land sold while
only 2.27 billion square meters are developed. The new regulation of confiscating lands
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idled for two years with no compensation forced the remaining 1.18 billion square meter
to speed up its development.
At the same time, residential property demand is expected to stay flat in 2010 and
2011. Morgan Stanley estimated the demand for residential property will be 920 million
square meter in 2010 and 850-900 million square meter in 2011. This is due to the
unfavorable policies homebuyers and potential tax laws in consideration.
Residential supply has outpaced demand to a level similar to what we have seen
in 2008 with an expected shortfall of over 25% in 2011 (Figure 2.4). Therefore, with the
exception of a few cities, most regions in China will feel the pricing pressure.
(mil sqm) Demand/Supply
1,400.0 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 140%
1,200.0 ------------------------------------ ---------------------- --- 120%
1,000.0 ---------------------------- ----------- ------ --- --- --- 100%
800.0 --------------- ----------------- ------ -- 80%
600.0 ---------------------------------------- - --- - -- -- 60%
400.0 --------------------------------- ------ 40%
200.0 --------------- - - -- - - - - -- 20%
-- 0%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E2011E
o Supply IIDemand -Demand/Supply
Figure 2.4 China Property Residential Supply and Demand
Source: CEIC, Morgan Stanley Research
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Arguments for it is NOT a bubble
1) Strong demand
Despite an expected 60% growth in housing supply in 2011, the demand
continues to outstrip supply in many tier 2 and tier 3 cities. Between 1990 and 2010, the
data from Bloomberg revealed the disposal income of urban household has jumped from
RMB 1,510 to RMB 19,109 and recorded an average annual growth rate of 13.6%. The
increase in disposal income provides strong demand for the large inventory supply.
While the national supply to demand ratio has risen to 1.65x, the data from Bank of
China below displayed the supply to demand ratio for cities such as Chengdu and Haikou
is below 1, translating a continue supply shortage among these cities (Figure 2.5).
Urbanization continued to provide strong housing demand for most urban cities in China.
However, the impact of housing oversupply may have a greater impact to Beijing, Tianjin,
Wuhan, Taiyuan, Dalian and Suzhou.
(x)
Overty cold mon Conforbtle zone
2.0 -----
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
CO CD r
Figure 2.5 Supple to Demand Ratio
Source: CREIS, Bank of China
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2) Affordability is not that unreasonable
While the affordability ratios in tier I cities are substantially higher than the
China nationwide figure, it is still within a reasonable range relative to other international
cities. Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are the epicenter of China's growth engine and
the affordability ratio is in line with Hong Kong and Singapore. Figure 2.6 displays the
affordability comparison across other major cities published by JP Morgan.
14
12.5 11.9 12.1
12 11.4
10 9.3
8 . 6.9 7.1 7
6 5.3
4
2
0
Beijing Shanghai Shenzhen Guangzhou China Mumbai Sydney Greater NYC Hong Kong Singapore
nationwide London
Figure 2.6 Comparison of Housing Price / Household Income Ratio
Source: JP Morgan Research
3) Low percentage of loan to value
China maintained strict lending practice in underwriting bank mortgages. Down
payment for first home is 30%, second home is 40% and there is currently a ban on third
home purchase. Mortgage payment is also limited to 50% of income. As a result,
between 2002 and 2009 mortgage issuance only made up to 34% of the total value of
residential property sold. Given the recent high price, people need to borrow more and
the recent new lending has leveled up to 70% of home value, but the overall national
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average is within 50%. Such low level of mortgage loan to value ratio provides sufficient
home equity buffer in case of a drop in property prices. As the national average of home
equity value is greater than 50%, it also safeguards against downward spiral caused by
distressed selling and further foreclosures experienced in US between 2008 and 2009.
4) Level of leverage is within control
The level of leverage in China is still substantially lower than the bubble period
experienced by Japan and US. The total debt in the private sector in China has been
steady and only rose to 110% of GDP after the stimulus plan package. In comparison,
the credit growth in Japan was 9% per year and credit to private sector was close to
double the GDP of Japan in 1991. Credit growth in US moved from 3% in 2000 to 7%
annually between 2002 and 2007. The total debt reached 205% of GDP in 2007. Within
five years before the bust of the bubble, both US and Japan increased their leverage levels
by 40%. In contrast, the level of leverage is still substantially lower in China.
5) Pre-emptive government policies
Unlike the taxation and regulations in Japan and US during the bubble era that
was biased towards real estate price appreciation, the Chinese government is proactive in
taking pre-emptive actions in curbing its inflating housing bubble. In addressing the
affordability issue for lower income households, China is building 10 million units of
affordable housing in 2011, up from its 5.9 million units in 2010, and ramps up the
construction starts of affordable housing to 30% of the total construction starts in China.
The development of affordable housing is a highly focus subject in the 12th Five Year
Plan in October 2010.
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D. Local Level
While the average property price over major 70 cities published by National
Development and Reform Commission from 2007 to 2010 rose 7.2% annually, it did not
fully capture the rapid pace of price increase in the tier 1 cities. KnightFrank published the
primary residential price growth for the top 10 cities doubled between 2007 and 2010 (Figure
2.7). In fact, Beijing recorded 41.6% year-on-year price jump within just one year, followed
by Guangzhou (26.5%) and Wuhan (24.4%) (Figure 2.8).
220
200
180
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120
100 ''''''''''*
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10
Figure 2.7 Primary residential price trend and YoY growth (ten major cities)
Source: KnightFrank, Beijing Holdways
Beijing 41.6%
Guangzhou 26.5%
Hangzhou 24.9%
Wuhan 24.4%
Shanghai 21.8%
Chongqing 19.5%
Tianjin 17.1%
Chengdu 16.2%
Shenzhen 10.3%
Shenyang 6.1%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0%
Figure 2.8 Property price year-on-year growth in 2010 (ten major cities)
Source: KnightFrank, Beijing Holdways
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1) Beijing
Beijing, China's capital city with 22 million population, is a good case study because
it has the strictest housing regulations and also one of the most expensive housing prices
among all other cities in China. New residential projects clustered around 5th and 6th Ring
Roads, such as Greenland and Greentown, are priced around RMB 15,000 per square meter
while luxury apartment in city center are priced over RMB 100,000 per square meter. As of
December 2010, while the city-wide average price of Beijing reached RMB 20,694 per
square meter, the average price for urban area in Beijing is RMB 29,349 per square meter
and the suburban area is RMB 15,236 per square meter. On February 17, 2011, Beijing
announced the most stringent HPR policies and requires 5 years of local residency proof in
Beijing in order to qualify for home purchase. These real estate cooling measures together
with credit tightening policies had a significant impact to the real estate transactions in
Beijing. As non-local purchase historically contributed close to 50% of the past transactions,
this announcement caused a 68% drop of sales volume in a single month (Figure 2.9).
February recorded a 20% price increase mainly due to the low price baseline in January as
affordable housing contributed 20% of January's transactions.
-Mth avg vo (mil sem2
3.0 2005 e 1 54 2007 1 28 20092010 v 1 sq 25,000
2006 =1 40 2008 0 73
2 5
Z5 20,000
2,0
15.000
15
1.0 
10,000
0.5 5,000
Jan-05 Jul.05 Jan-O6 Jul-06 Jan-07 Ju-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul.09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-i1
- Primary sales vl (L) ---- MIhly Avg vol (L) -- 9- ASP (R)
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GFA sold 0.41 1.26 -68% -47% 3.80 2.78 2.62 3.19
(mil sgn I
Units sold 3,529 10,116 -65% -52% 34,642 23,139 20,846 29,204
ASP 23,585 19,658 20% 58% 18,225 17,954 18,277 17,392
Figure 2.9 Beijing Monthly Primary Residential Sales
Source: Centaline, JP Morgan
Inventory Analysis
Due to the announcement of policies, Beijing has buildup significant inventory as
transaction volume has continued to decrease. As of February 2011, the total GFA available
for sale in Beijing reached 12.03 million square meter. Using the February demand of 0.43
million square meter, the currently inventory buildup would take 28.3 months. Using the
average demand for the past twelve months, 1.00 million square meter / month, the inventory
buildup would take 12.0 months to deplete. This is similar to the level in 2007 before the
market crash, and higher than the average 8 to 9 months commonly seen in other years.
Affordability
To better understand the affordability of the housing market in Beijing, the
calculation in Figure 2.10 assumed an average household with two income earners making
RMB 73,208 a year in Beijing. In order to make their first home purchase in a suburban area,
they must comply with the new housing regulations of 30% down payment and mortgage
payment of not exceeding 50% of their income. For a 50 square meter unit, the mortgage
payment, assuming 20 years tenor and 5.55% interest, requires a monthly payment of RMB
4,688, which is 54% higher than their maximum allowed level. As a result, they can only
afford a maximum unit size of 32 square meter in 2010. Assuming their income continues to
grow at 13% p.a., the historical 5 year CAGR, an average household can afford an 50 square
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meter apartment in 2013 only if the property price drops 20% in 2011 and maintain minimal
growth close to inflation for the next two years.
While this is not an official definition of housing bubble, the prices in Beijing show
signs of overheating and have grown beyond the reach of a typical household. Inventory
build also suggested Beijing is an overheated, over-supply city. The large drop in transaction
volume after the release of new housing regulations suggests the number of investors or
speculators may outnumber the actual end users in the market.
Figure 2.10 Affordability Scenario
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2) Shanghai
Shanghai has the highest level of average income and also the most expensive
average housing prices in China. With a 19 million population, the income per capita
reached RMB 32,403 in 2009 with a 12% CAGR from 2005 to 2009. As of December 2010,
while the average housing price in Shanghai is RMB 25,080 per square meter, the average
prices in urban areas is RMB 39,301 per square meter and the suburban areas is RMB 20,644
per square meter. On January 31, 2011, Shanghai announced the city level "Eight Point
Measures" and real estate tax (RET). Along with other anti-speculation measures, Shanghai
was the first batch of cities to levy a 0.4% property tax on new purchases and 0.6% if the
purchase exceeds twice the residential housing prices of the previous year. Primary sales
volume dropped 69% from January to February to the lowest level since 2006. If excluding
affordable housing numbers, the sales volume in fact dropped 83% on a monthly basis. ASP
also dropped 4% between January and February 2011. The large drop in transaction volume
with relatively small dip in prices suggests many developers are in the mode of "hold and see"
and delayed existing projects.
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GFA sold 0.52 1.70 -69% -13% 5.29 4.32 3.05 3.06
(mil sgm)
Units sold 5,501 16,294 -66% -5% 48,804 40,309 31,993 29,056
ASP 14,937 15,525 -4% 22% 13,995 12,746 13,794 12,494
Figure 2.11 Shanghai Monthly Primary Residential Sales
Source: Centaline, JP Morgan
Inventory Analysis
Shanghai has buildup some level of inventory as transaction volume dropped in 2011.
As of February 2011, the total GFA available for sale in Shanghai reached 6.29 million
square meter. Using the February demand of 0.52 million square meter, the currently
inventory buildup would take 12.1 months. Using the average demand for the past twelve
months, 1.35 million square meter / month, the inventory buildup would take 4.7 months to
deplete. While this level is similar to the level witnessed in 2007, the short turnaround cycle
suggest the strong demand and under supply situation in Shanghai. The average inventory
turnover level between 2006 and 2009, excluding 2007, has always been around 2 to 3
months.
Affordability
Despite the average income level of Shanghai is very similar to Beijing, the average
price per square meter is 35% higher, thereby creating a larger discrepancy between average
household income and mortgage payments. In 2010, the required monthly payment of a 50
square meter unit doubled the maximum level of an average household. Even if the property
price dropped 30% in 2011 and remained flat for another two years, the required monthly
mortgage payment is still higher than the maximum allowed level, despite a 12% continuous
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gain in income. In the scenario below, an average household can only afford a 30 square
meter unit only if the housing price dropped by 30% in 2011.
The affordability in Shanghai is worse than Beijing and belongs to the overheated
category. While industry reports suggests many potential buyers stepped to the sidelines
waiting to work out how to buy given the current measures, even the suburban areas
remained out of reach for an average household. Shanghai displayed an overheated but
under-supply city. In comparison with the large stockpile in Bejing, Shanghai implies the
housing prices has potential to move further up supported by continuous strong demand in
the market.
Figure 2.12 Affordability Scenario
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3) Hangzhou
Hangzhou is the capital city of Zhejiang province with close to 7 million population.
As a tier 2 city, Hangzhou recorded tier 1 city housing prices. By allowing primary
homebuyers in Hangzhou with over RMB 1 million annual income to move their residency to
the city, Hangzhou recorded leading volume of land sales despite a much smaller population
than Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Investments into residential real estate have been
strong and reached RMB 70.5 billion in 2009 with a five year CAGR of 22%. The average
price per square meter in Hangzhou in 2010 is RMB 18,082, with urban areas averaged RMB
23,874 per square meter and suburban areas averaged RMB 14,503 per square meter. On
March 1, 2011, Hangzhou set a maximum level of mortgage to 70% of the property value for
primary home purchase and 40% for second home purchase.
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GFA sold 0.09 0.29 -68% 117% 1.02 1.02 0.53 0.33
(mil sgm)
Units sold 757 2,575 -71% -45% 8,896 8,957 10,366 8,877
ASP 25,992 23,119 12% 4% 22,729 23,177 21,542 20,992
Figure 2.13 Hangzhou Monthly Primary Residential Sales
Source: Centaline, JP Morgan
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Since the launch of the housing cooling measures, Hangzhou recorded a 68% drop in
GFA from January to February 2011. Yet, price recorded a 12% increase on a monthly basis.
Industry reports demonstrated that historically investors and speculators contributed a large
portion of the property demand in Hangzhou. These investment demands disappeared after
the launch of the anti-speculation measures, which drove down the total number of visitors at
various real estate projects 30-50%! For example, 80% of the buyers in the Xiasha new
development zone are comprised of non-local resident purchasers.
Inventory Analysis
Hangzhou has buildup one of the highest inventory levels in China as transaction
volume plummet in 2011. As of February 2011, the total GFA available for sale in
Hangzhou reached 3.05 million square meter. Using the February demand of 0.09 million
square meter, the currently inventory buildup would take 32.4 months. Using the average
demand for the past twelve months, 0.26 million square meter / month, the inventory buildup
would take 11.7 months to deplete. The large increase in supply is partially driven by a
significant increase in number of projects reached presale standards in January.
Affordability
A typical household with two income earners in Hangzhou would make an average
household income of RMB 68,564 in 2010. This translates into a maximum level of
mortgage payment of RMB 2,857 per month, over 50% lower than the existing level with a
70% mortgage value, 20 years tenor, and 5.55% mortgage interest rate. At the current level,
an average household can only support a 30 square meter unit. If the housing prices dropped
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20% in 2011 and maintained a growth rate similar to inflation in 2012 and 2013, an average
household can began to afford a 50 square meter unit by 2013.
The ratios in fact are quite similar to Beijing and this suggests the real estate market
in Hangzhou is overheated and a typical household cannot afford an average suburban
apartment. The fact that a substantial amount of homebuyers are investors and speculators
made the anti-speculation measures more effective. Therefore, Hangzhou as a tier 2 city
belongs to an overheated, over-supply city. The significant decrease in buyer's interest made
the Hangzhou property market vulnerable to a correction.
Figure 2.14 Affordability Scenario
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4) Chongqing
Chongqing is an important economic hub located in the southwest part of China. It is
one of the five national central cities and one of the four municipalities with over 33 million
population. The average housing price in Chongqing is RMB 6,842 per square meter, while
the average for urban areas is RMB 7,046 per square meter and the average for suburban
areas is RMB 5,285 per square meter. After the anti-speculation measures, many developers
postponed existing projects and led to a 58% decrease in primary property sales and 19%
drop in price between January and February 2011. While the actual implementation details
have yet to announce, many developers continued to wait and see.
Due to the recent policies, new housing projects set prices slightly below the Real
Estate Tax threshold level or offer cash rebates that is equivalent to similar levels. Projects
with prices higher than RET displayed much slower sales level. In addition, if the purchase
is below 90 square meter, Chongqing require non-local commodity home purchasers to have
a college degree in order to be eligible to move their residency to Chongqing.
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GFA sold 0.69 1.64 -58% -38% 6.54 5.68 5.15 4.31
(mil sgm)
Units sold 7,722 18,260 -58% -36% 71,581 62,601 58,238 49,314
ASP 5,849 7,185 -19% 13% 6,714 6,028 5,677 5,000
Figure 2.15 Chongqing Monthly Primary Residential Sales
Source: Centaline, JP Morgan
Inventory Analysis
Chongqing has accumulated a more sustainable inventory levels in China even
though transaction volume dropped in 2011. As of February 2011, the total GFA available
for sale in Chongqing reached 9.25 million square meter. Using the February demand of
0.69 million square meter, the currently inventory buildup would take 13.4 months. Using
the average demand for the past twelve months, 1.81 million square meter / month, the
inventory buildup would take 5.1 months to deplete.
Affordability
Despite housing prices recorded 14% five year CAGR between 2005 and 2009, the
affordability ratio of Chongqing remained healthy. Income per capita has also been
increasing at a five year CAGR of 13% and the affordability ratio remained 6x to 7x. Under
the recent stringent anti-speculation policies, an average household is able to afford a 50
square meter suburban unit if the housing prices remain flat in 2011. The maximum allowed
mortgage payment is sufficient to cover a mortgage in 2011 in our scenario testing. As
Chongqing aims to become the economic hub of the Southwestern part of China and to
increase foreign trade and capital flow, the housing market in Chongqing still has further
upside potential. Chongqing can be characterized as a tier 2 city that is not overheated,
under-supply city.
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Figure 2.16 Affordability Scenario
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M11. A New Frontier - Affordable Housing
Affordable housing is the new frontier of the real estate market development in China and
an important effort by the Chinese government to the tame the housing prices through an
increase in supply. To balance the housing structure and to stabilize the speculative behavior on
property prices, China is planning to invest RMB 1.3 trillion (USD 198 billion) to build
subsidized homes for rent or sale to low income residents and committed to build 36 million
units of public homes in five years. Affordable housing will make up close to one-fifth of the
China's total real estate investment in 2011. To avoid potential cannibalization of land supply
consumed by affordable housing and private housing, the Chinese government sold 1.86 billion
square meter of residential land in 2010, an effective 142% increase over the 0.765 billion square
meter sold in 2009 and 238% increase over the 0.547 billion square meter sold in 2008. In tier 1
cities where new land supply is limited, the government enforces stricter idle land confiscation
and encourages more urban renewal projects. As real estate investment now contributed 10% of
the GDP, China is determined to curb its rising inflation and property prices via the affordable
housing projects. Affordable housing was introduced in 1993 as part of the housing reform
policy and started to gain its significance in 2008.
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A. Affordable Housing Categories
There are five major types of affordable housing in China targeting various low-
income to marginal middle-income groups, separated into commodity housing and non
commodity housing.
Commodity Housing Category
1) Economic housing
Economic housing is provided by the state-owned real estate companies to meet the
housing demand of the marginal middle-income families with minimal 3 years of local
residency status. The applicant income limit is RMB 22,700 or below for singles and family
net worth of RMB 240,000 or below. Economic housing is distributed via allotment and
priorities are given to households being relocated by urban settlement projects. The average
living space is less than 10 square meter per capita and the price of economic housing is
approximately 50% to 70% below the price of private housing. The ownership is
transferable after a fixed number of years and became part of commodity housing.
2) Price-cap housing
Price-cap housing was introduced by the Central government in 2006 for the marginal
middle-income families that is ineligible for economic housing. It was first introduced in
Guangzhou and Beijing for middle-income households with annual income no higher than
RMB 88,000 or a total net worth less than RMB 570,000. The average living space per
capita is capped at 15 square meter. Price-cap housing constructions are opened to all
developers through a tender process. The unit size is capped at 90 square meters and the unit
price is around 50% to 60% of the price of similar private housing. Rather than categorized
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as affordable housing, price-cap housing in fact is closer to the mass-end private housing.
There is no government subsidizes but land revenue for local government is relatively lower
than private housing. This new housing category is increasingly popular because it addresses
the goal of stabilizing housing prices while require substantially less subsidies on land prices
than economic housing. As a result, local governments have greater incentives to develop
price-cap housing. The price-cap housing in Beijing, Tianjin and Jiangsu comprised 60% of
the total price-cap housing sites in China. Price-cap housing units are tradable after 5 years
of purchase.
Non-Commodity Housing Category
3) Low rent housing
In 1998, low rent housing was introduced by local governments to target the bottom
10% low-income household with local residency status who cannot afford a home purchase.
The income limit for low rent housing application is RMB 6,960 per person or household net
worth less than RMB 150,000. The average living space is 7.5 square meter per capita. The
local government subsidizes the rents of these low rent housing, which is often built by state-
owned real estate enterprise or bought from the private developers. The rent level is
approximately RMB 60 to RMB 150 per month in first tier cities and RMB 30 to RMB 60
per month in other cities. All non-commodity housings are not tradable and sublet is
forbidden for low rent housing.
4) Public rental housing
Public rental housing was introduced in 2007-2008 due to the increasing housing
demand from the large mobile workers population in urban cities. These mobile workers
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lacks local residency status, with income that is over the requirements of low rent housing,
but cannot afford economic housing. Public rental housing is mostly constructed by local
government owned real estate companies and the unit size is capped at 60 square meter.
Sublet is forbidden and the rental rates are at a discount to market rate.
5) Shanty town resettlement
Shanty town resettlement was the Chinese Central government effort to address the
needs of shanty town occupants in Northern China. As of 2009, there were estimated 15.5
million families residing in squatters or slum areas in China. These resettlement homes are
non commodity housing and they are not tradable. The land occupied is deemed as
government use.
B. Construction Starts
The percentage of construction starts for these groups among the total construction
starts jumped from 7% in 2005 to 18-20% in 2008-2009 and expected to further increase to
30-38% in 2010-2011. JP Morgan estimates the total affordable housing construction starts
reached 426 million meter square in 2010. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution and trend of
new construction starts for affordable housing in China.
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Figure 3.1 New Construction Starts for Affordable Housing in China
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
National Bureau of Statistics of China
Construction starts for affordable housing only began to pick up recently (Figure 3.2)
and became a substantial portion of the housing market by 2011. Historically the
development has been slow due to lack of incentives and a misalignment of interest with the
local governments. Despite the Central government's promotion on affordable housing with
the original goal of completing 3.9 million economic housing units and 5.9 million low-rent
housing units between 2009 and 2011, the World Bank estimated only 62% commenced
construction in 2009. Beijing achieved its 5 year plan and completed 30 million square meter
of affordable housing, but Shanghai and Guangzhou only met 30% of its original 5 year plan
targets. The lack of affordable land for construction is a major reason of the shortfall
because local governments lacked the incentives to allocate more lands for affordable
housing. In fact, 611 million square meter of land were planned for affordable housing but
only 95 million square meter or 16% were actually supplied. In addition, the local
governments also lacked the funding and commitment to initiate affordable housing
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development. This can be seen in the deviation between the planned and actual spending on
affordable housing between Central government and local government (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.2 New Construction Starts for Affordable Housing vs Private Housing
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
National Bureau of Statistics of China
Figure 3.3 Affordable Housing Spending in 2009
Central government spending 49 55
Local government spending 118 39
Total overnment ndin 168 95
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD)
Soufun
The setback in 2009 made the Chinese government more determined to achieve its
2010 targets. The Central government sets its target at 3 million units of affordable housing,
2.8 million units of resettlement homes and 1.2 million units of rural redevelopment homes
for 2010. As of Sep 2010, close to 90% of the construction starts have commenced, an
equivalent of 5.1 million units. Affordable housing will remain as an important sector for
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Chinese government to improve the housing condition and address issues relating to
urbanization in China:
1) Improve the living space of low-income household to minimum 13 square meter per
capita
2) Eliminate shanty towns by 2013 and complete 850-927 million square meter of
resettlement homes for 15.5 million households within the next three years
C. Financing
In comparison to the scarce land supply for affordable housing, financing as well as
misalignment of interest remains the core issue of the slow development of affordable
housing. The funding for the development of affordable housing remains heavily dependent
on the local government levels. The five major source of funding include:
0 Central government fiscal revenue
e Local government contribution
e Sales proceeds from economic housing
* 10% of net income from land sales proceeds (local government)
e Returns from Housing Provident Fund
Figure 3.4 shows the details of the historical funding sources and use of proceeds for
affording housing. In 2010, the Central government aims to provide RMB 69 billion while
local governments needs to contribute RMB 371 billion to affordable housing. In order to
ensure sufficient land is reserved for affordable housing, a reward and penalty system is in
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place. The Central government announced to suspend high end residential land auction if
local governments fail to meet their affordable housing target. A bonus of RMB 10 billion is
also in place to encourage local governments ranking top in meeting its goals.
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Figure 3.4 Affording Housing Spending and Funding
Source: Ministry of Finance, Soufun
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There is substantial burden for local governments to meet the affordable housing
target. Other than affluent cities such as Beijing, many other local governments may require
other sources of funding:
0 Local government budgets
Some local governments already increased land appreciation tax (LAT) from 1-2% to
2-5%
e Housing Provident Fund
The Housing Provident Fund was established in 1994 to provide subsidized mortgage
loans to ordinary wage earners. The Central government allocated RMB 49.3 billion
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from the Housing Provident Funds to finance 133 affordable housing constructions
over 28 cities.
* Capital Market
Alternative fundraising mechanisms from capital market such as REITs, bond
issuance, bank lending. In 2010, a proposal of an affordable-housing-backed REIT in
Shanghai and Tianjin were submitted for State Council approval.
* Land Sales Proceeds
Starting from 2007, local governments are required to set aside 10% of the land sales
proceeds to affordable housing projects.
* Affordable Housing Proceeds
Net income proceeds from price-cap housing, economic housing and low-rent
housing
* Insurance Companies
The China Insurance Regulatory Commission approved insurance companies in
China to invest 10% of their assets in real estate, which represents a potential RMB
450 billion investment capital. Parts of the RMB 450 billion can be important fund
provider for the affordable housing projects.
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D. Challenges
1) Misalignment of interest
Land sales proceeds have traditionally attributed 20% to 30% of the local
government revenues. In 2009, the land transfer fee jumped 43.2% to RMB 1.42 trillion,
30.5% of the local government revenues. However, the land sales proceeds for economic
housing development are minimal. Even the proceeds from land sale for price-cap
housing are substantially less than private housing. The following example further
illustrates the calculations:
Assumption:
0 Land price for price-cap housing development is 50% less than private housing
0 2009 average revenue per square meter = RMB 1,800
Revenue Loss:
1,000,000 square meter x 2.5 plot ratio x RMB 900 per square meter = RMB 2.25 billion
Per 1 million square meter of land allocated to price-cap housing projects, RMB
2.25 billion of land sale revenues are lost. Therefore, the commitments for local
governments to develop affordable housing projects translate into foregoing large amount
of land sale revenue. The misalignment of interest and lack of incentives presents great
challenges in a successful implementation of the affordable housing projects.
2) Low yields from low-rent housing
Due to the low rental rate nature of low-rent housing, rental yields are very low
and the economics of this category presents the greatest funding challenge. As economic
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housing and price cap housing can be sold upon completion, financing is relatively easier.
Local governments need to forgo land sale proceeds and the low-rent housing projects
require a long repayment period. Therefore, development of low-rent housing presents a
difficult financing challenge for local governments.
E. Related Policies
The Central government is committed to endorse the development of affordable
housing and implemented a number of related policies to make local governments
accountable for the development progress.
Figure 3.5 Announced Policies relating to the Development of Affordable Housing
Beijing Jan Increased the mandatory land allocation for affordable housing
2010 in commercial housing projects from 15% to 30%
Shanghai Jun Increased the mandatory land allocation for affordable housing
2010 in commercial housing projects from 0% to 5%
Fujian May A "Responsibility Statement" is signed between the provincial
2010 government and municipal governments regarding 47,075
economic housing units, 5,300 subsidized rental housing units
and 24,641 resettlement homes. Cities that failed to complete its
affordable housing quotes will held direct responsibility.
Beijing, Aug Approved to use RMB 50 billion of Housing Providence Fund to
Tianjin, 2010 finance 133 affordable housing projects across 28 cities
Chongqing,
etc. 28 cities
Source: Xinhua News
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F. Potential Impact
As construction starts for affordable housing will soon surpass that of private housing,
the impact of affordable housing can be significant to the housing market. Based on the
available data on the national disposable income level and the gaps between private and
affordable housing across various tiers of cities, we can calculate the expected population
size that will be impacted by affordable housing projects.
1) Percentage of household that requires affordable housing
Using the national average price per square meter and size of private housing and
economic housing, we can estimate the expected mortgage payment for an average
household. Figure 3.6 displayed the assumptions used in the calculation.
Figure 3.6 Assumption
Avg sales price 4,750 2,500
Avg unit size 90 65
Total Value 427,500 162,500
Loan to Value 70% 70%
Mortgage Rate 5.22% 5.22%
Tenor 10yrs 10yrs
Avg Monthly Payment 3,795 1,443
Using the data from National Bureau of Statistics of China and JP Morgan's
estimate, we calculated the affordability of an average household in China for both
private housing and economic housing. The results displayed in figure 3.7 showed that
60% of the population, or 268 million household, cannot afford private housing in China.
The bottom 10% of the population, or 45 million household, cannot afford economic
housing in China, with the only alternative of low rent housing. As a result, 50% of the
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households in China require either economic housing, price-cap housing or a smaller
private housing. With less than 7 million units of private housing are sold every year,
only 1 in 30 households can purchase a unit per year. According to National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 35% are first time homebuyers and thus the remaining is taken either
by investors or upgraders. JP Morgan estimated that currently there are only 13 million
units existing stocks of affordable housing in China. The shortage is expected to be large
in the next decade.
Figure 3.7 Housing Affordability in China
Ex pecte d Private Housing Economic Housing
Income Annual Disposable Average Expected Monthly Mortgage Payment / Housing Value / Mortgage Payment / Housing Value/
Level Income per Capita* Size* Houshold Income Monthly Income Annual Income Monthly Income Annual Income
Top 10% 52,571 2.5 10,952 35% 3.3 13% 1.2
10 - 20% 31,641 2.6 6,856 55% 5.2 21% 2.0
20-40% 22,631 2.7 5,092 75% 7.0 28% 2.7
40- 60% 16,437 2.9 3,972 96% 9.0 36% 3.4
69 - 80% 11,984 3.1 3,096 123% 11.5 47% 4.4
80- 90% 8,655 3.2 2,308 164% 15.4 63% 5.9
Bottom 10% 5,540 3.3 1,524 249% 23.4 95% 8.9
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, JP Morgan
2) Large price gaps in tier 1 cities
To better assess the expected demand of affordable housing in China, we
compared the regional price gap between private housing and economic housing. The
data from Soufun and JP Morgan (Figure 3.8) suggests the demand for affordable
housing is greatest in tier 1 cities and relatively less in tier 2 and 3 cities. This is an
interesting discovery and contrary to the expected prediction of cities with higher average
income should have relatively less demand for affordable housing. In fact, the price for
private housing in tier 1 cities has gone up so quickly that it produced the greatest pricing
gap with economic housing.
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Figure 3.8 Regional Price Gap between Private Housing and Economic Housing
Econ Housing Private Housing Discount
11er-1 cities
Beijing 4,539 19,208 -76%
Shanghai NA 14,280 NA
Guangzhou 3,702 10,331 -64%
Shenzhen NA 18,450 NA
TVer-2 ities
Chengdu 3,333 5,762 -42%
Chongqing 2,418 3,868 -37%
Hangzhou 3,172 13,751 -77%
Nanjing 2,603 9,623 -73%
Shenyang 2,894 4,962 -42%
Tianjin 4,681 8,224 -43%
Wuhan 2,976 5,456 -45%
Tier-3 cities
Hefei NA 5,294 NA
Jinan NA 6,053 NA
Source: Soufun, JP Morgan
3) Potential Spillover
The completion of 5.9 million units of affordable housing requires an estimated
investment of RMB 696 billion. The value chain of real estate development has a far
reaching effect to many levels and layers of upstream suppliers and downstream
distributors. According to a research published by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-
Rural Development, the capital investment into property development has a multiplier
effect of six. In another words, the expected RMB 696 billion capital investment will
translate into a RMB 4.17 trillion impact to the overall economy.
While the impact of affordable housing can be limited to only the lower income tier
of the population, there is still a substantial portion of the population that will be benefited
from affording housing developments. However, the annual income qualification for low-
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rent housing application in Beijing is an upper limit of RMB 9,271, which is substantially
below Beijing's 2010 average disposal income level of RMB 29,073. Thus, the users of
affordable housing may not be current buyers of private housing and thus have limited
impact on the private property prices. In addition, the projected 36 million units of
affordable housing in five years are still much smaller than the existing private real estate
market. As a result, there are ambiguities in the actual impact of affordable housing to the
commodity housing market.
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IV. Opportunities to Property Developers
As affordable housing is becoming the central focus for the Chinese policymakers and an
important item on the China's 12th Five-Year Plan, large amount of investment capital is
pouring into this sector. In 2005, among a total of RMB 1,086 billion invested in real estate
investment, only RMB 52 billion are invested in economic housing and RMB 2 billion in low-
rent housing and resettlement homes. In 2010, the investment in economic housing reached
RMB 141 billion and investment in low-rent housing and resettlement homes reached RMB 626
billion. At this critical junction point, the emergence of affordable housing can have a number of
implications and opportunities to existing incumbents as well as potential disruptors. Small real
estate developers may be able to leverage this opportunity to expand their market share and
benefit from the policy biases.
As the current private housing market is frozen due to government regulations, many
developers have turned to other markets but not affordable housing due to the historical low
margins. For example, SOHO China expressed its continued interest to expand into commercial
targeted markets beyond Beijing and isolate the company from the recent residential cooling
measures. As the Chinese real estate developers are slowly progressing into a consolidation
phase, this can be a great timing for smaller player to disrupt the existing large players and
achieve a potential greater market share.
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A. Incumbent Players - China Vanke
Founded in 1984 in Shenzhen, China Vanke ("Vanke") is the largest residential
homebuilder in China in terms of revenue and GFA sold. Vanke is listed in the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange in 1992 and over the years has grown to a RMB 113 billion market cap
leading real estate giant that focuses on residential real estate development in Pearl River
Delta and the Yangtze River Delta area. In 2010, Vanke recorded RMB 50.7 billion revenue
and RMB 6.6 billion net profits. As the property market in China is highly fragmented with
the top ten developers controlling merely 9.5% of the total market share, Vanke is clearly the
market leader. Vanke has grown its market share from 0.8% in 2001 to 1.23% in 2006 and
2.34% in 2008. As the largest property developer, Vanke established sufficient national
brand awareness to command approximately 15% price premium over its peers in most tier 1
and tier 2 cities..
Vanke is a great representative of the real estate developer sector in China. As a
dominating player, Vanke's reactions towards the recent housing policies are also similar to
most other incumbent players, which can be generalized into three basic approaches.
1) Diversify geographic mix
The housing cooling measures are more stringent in tier 1 cities than others,
characterized by the different price growth and affordability ratios experienced in recent
years. As a result, sales in tier 1 cities experienced a larger drop in transaction volume
relative to other tier cities. Vanke diversified its geographical presence with 30 million
square meter of GFA land bank across 31 cities in China (Figure 4.1). Similar to other
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incumbent real estate developers, migrating to second or third tier cities mitigates the
focus of the recent housing policies and minimizes the regulatory risk on a city level.
Figure 4.1 Vanke's Land Bank Distribution
Yan ze River Delta 30% Tier 1 Cities 21%
Pearl River Delta 28% Tier 2 Cities 43%
Bohai Rim 26% Other 36%
Other 16%
Source: Company data
2) Diversify product mix
Different demographics and geographic demonstrate different sets of needs and
purchase behaviors. In order to diversify geographically, real estate developers need to
build residential units that can cater to the local demands. Vanke is one of the early
developers that target end users by developing simple fitted, small sized units. In
response to the 70/90 rule announced in 2006 (70% of residential developments needs to
be below 90 square meters for small and medium families purchases), Vanke developed
greater number of small size units after such announcement (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Vanke's Product Mix
2005 17% 58% 24%
2006 18% 61% 22%
2007 28% 52% 20%
2008 46% 38% 16%
2009 57% 29% 14%
2010 55% 33% 12%
Source: Company data
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3) Diversify customer group
The housing policies have different impact to different customer group. They are
more stringent to investors, speculators, and other customer groups that are not first time
home purchasers or first time upgraders. Vanke diversified its customer group to
minimize such concentrated exposures. Before 2005, Vanke has traditionally been mid-
end developers with 82% of its products catered for home upgrade purchasers. In recent
years, Vanke has diversified its product mix. As a result, the portion of first-time home
purchasers increased from 11.5% in 2005 to 35% in 2010 (Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3 Vanke's Customer Group
2008 24% 28% 32% 16%
2009 30% 23% 28% 19%
2010 35% 27% 25% 13%
Source: Company data
Stratepry Analysis
The above strategies adopted by most real estate developers are clearly passive in
nature. Diversify geographic mix require strong local knowledge and detailed due diligence.
Geographic expansion only in reaction to government policies has high execution risk if
implemented in a short window timeframe. Also, as affordable housing become a strong
focus of the housing policies and will attribute close to half the construction starts in 2011,
the proportion will remain large in near terms and the supply of small residential units will be
large. Developers with a large portion of small units in their portfolio mix risk competing
with economic housing, of which the prices are significantly cheaper. The regulatory
policies in the near terms are likely to be unfavorable to most developers until price level
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return to a more affordable level. Tighten credit policies are likely to persist and banks are
becoming more selective on loan extensions. As affordable housing takes priority in terms of
construction starts and land supply, it may lead to a crowding out effect on the land supply to
private residential market. Together with less financing channels, smaller developers that
lacked sufficient cash for land acquisition or capital for idled land development have a high
chance of being an acquisition target.
As cashflow is getting tighter, other than cutting prices to push existing inventory,
many incumbent players may also choose alternatives such deferring construction capex,
reduce new land acquisitions and new construction starts. In fact, most existing players rely
more on contract sales. Yet these measures will reduce their development pipeline and
market share. As developer defer their project launches, it ties up even more cash and adding
further cashflow constraints on future project developments. For example, Vanke has a three
year landbank and this translate into a need to replenish one-third of its landbank every year.
Deferring existing projects will limit its resource in acquiring new lands.
Withstanding the risks mentioned above, most property developers will still choose to
avoid the center focus of the policies and move to other areas with comparable project
margins rather than to adapt to the potential opportunities embraced by the affordable
housing policies. Incumbent players often indulged in the pursuit of profit margins without
realizing the emergence of a potential disruption. An example is the maniac in 2007 where
almost all property developers are chasing for land bank expansion, an unsustainable way to
mark price appreciation via land acquisitions and resulted in RMB 1.2 billion provision for
Vanke during the 2008 market downturn. As affordable housing and other cooling measures
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disrupt the existing market, most firms believe the disruption will be temporary and will
retreat to areas with similar margins and open themselves for disruptions.
B. Potential Disruptor - BBMG Corp
BBMG Corp ("BBMG") is a leading building material and real estate developer
focused on Beijing. Established in December 6, 2005 by BBMG Group Company, its state
owned parent, BBMG is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in July 2009. BBMG now
has a market capitalization of HKD 15.3 billion and produced HKD 12.4 billion revenue and
HKD 2.0 billion net profit in 2009. The company has four main businesses: cement
production & distribution, building materials, property investment & management, and
property development. Property investment and development contributed over 50% of its
2009 gross profit. BBMG is primarily located in Beijing but also engaged in commodity
housing development in Hangzhou and Inner Mongolia. According to the State Council
Development Research Centre, BBMG ranked first in brand value for real estate companies
in northern China.
BBMG is a small sized homebuilder in terms of production volume with merely over
5 million square meter of GFA sold since 1987 (including office buildings, commodity
housing and affordable housing). Yet BBMG is currently the largest developer for economic
housing in Beijing with a 4% market share. To leverage on the recent housing policy bias,
BBMG is actively involved in developing affordable housing, contributing half of the total
GFA booked in 2010. BBMG has a large industrial land bank of 8.3 million square meter
and the company can apply to the govermnent to convert from industrial land to residential
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sites. Residential sites for affordable housing projects will be granted higher plot ratios and
BBMG's 8.3 million square meter industrial land can be translated into 22 million square
meter in total GFA, potentially providing 27,500 affordable housing units.
The business model of converting industrial land for affordable housing projects is
unique for BBMG. These sites allocated by the government for affordable housing projects
are not required to go through a tender or auction process. Unlike traditional residential sites,
land premium upfront for affordable housing projects are waived and banks provide
preferential treatment for bank loans. While conventional land conversion would incur a
land conversion premium, BBMG is not required to pay the difference between the land
transfer fee for industrial and residential use if the land is used to build economic or low-rent
housing. The land development and relocation cost according to management is immaterial.
Traditionally the net margins for affordable housing are capped at 3-5%. Yet, BBMG
managed to leverage its cheap land source and policy biases and generate 30% gross margins
and 13-15% net margins from these originally low-margin affordable housing projects.
For example, BBMG converted an industrial land in Shijingshan to provide 730,000
square meter in GFA for economic houses (258,000 square meter), price-cap houses
(214,000 square meter), and other retail and ancillary spaces (254,000 square meter).
Located in a high-end residential neighborhood, the prices for these affordable houses are
between RMB 6,000 and RMB 10,000 per square meter, approximately 60 to 75% cheaper
than the nearby private residential units.
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Strategv Analysis
While BBMG has a significant concentration risk in certain cities, it has developed
deep penetration and local knowledge in the cities it operates. Its strong presence and access
in Beijing allow BBMG to acquire prime location lands or lands at below-the-market costs
through restricted bidding. BBMG is also qualified to become a primary land developer.
BBMG is compensated with a cost plus 15% margin if the land is successfully auctioned and
also has the right to bid for government sites at public auction or to tender at attractive prices.
The unique business model of BBMG has the potential to become a disruptor to the
existing real estate market. While most of the large real estate developers are not interested
in the low margin affordable housing projects, BBMG is able to bridge the gap while making
substantial profit margins. In fact, this fits into the classic low-end disruption model. The
mass consumers in China are non consumers that cannot afford commodity housing are
happy to enter the affordable housing program. Similar to the mini mills and US Steel
example, the low end disruptor can transform the market by entering from the low end of the
market while existing incumbents retreat to areas with higher margins. By participating in
the development of affordable housing, it offered the following advantage to BBMG or
similar small players:
e Secure land supply at a low cost
As the real estate price in China continues to soar, many small players were
unable to compete with deep pocket developers in land auctions and were forced out of
the market or being acquired. The land for affordable housing is allocated by the
government, avoiding the expensive auction bidding process and minimizing the
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competition with existing large developers. Also, the local governments do not require a
land premium charge upfront, further alleviating the capital constraints of small players.
e Large end users demand
Close to 50% of the Chinese population requires economic housing. Historically
the huge end users demand has not been met as the supply has traditionally been very
limited and many households are forced to live in a very small private housing unit or
remote places. Developers for affordable housing are almost risk free in selling its
affordable housing units to the enormous demand.
e Complementary policies
In addition to favorable government policies on land allocation process and land
prices, banks will also offer complementary services such as preferential treatment on
bank loans and mortgage lending. This ensures the financing channel for the developers
and also the distribution of affordable housing units upon completion.
e Goodwill
In addition to the economic benefits from participating
projects, developers also receive goodwill from the process.
government to address their social priority and implement
policies, this can be an excellent opportunity to develop
policymakers and establish goodwill to the public.
in the affordable housing
By helping the Chinese
their affordable housing
good relationship with
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V. Recommendation
Every market has its boom and bust cycles. The Chinese market is too big and too
important to ignore in today's globalize economy. This section recommends the options
available for bearish investors looking for exposure on either just the China's property market or
China's overall economy. Currently there are very limited investment instruments available for
investors with a bearish view on the Chinese real estate market. While Chinese regulation has
approved short selling in China on March 2010, the related liquidity in 2010 proved to be very
limited and comprised only a very minor fraction of regular trading volume. International
investors currently cannot directly long or short shares in China's onshore stock market unless
with special institutional regulatory approval.
Bearish on just real estate market
Bearish investors who only want exposure to China's property market can short Chinese
real estate companies or developers with significant exposure in China that are listed in the Hong
Kong stock exchange. Unlike the US housing bubble era where many household are highly
levered, the lowly levered average household in China has strong saving deposits and large home
equity cushion against a potential drop in housing prices. On the other hand, the Chinese real
estate developers have in fact borrowed piles of debt over the past to load up their land bank.
Figure 6.1 below showed the debt level of some of the largest Chinese developers that are listed
in Hong Kong. In fact, the Guangzhou Daily reported that 40 property developers have piled up
RMB 600 billion worth of debt. There are significant refinancing risks and interest rate hikes
caused by inflation fears can depress their profit margins. In addition, if current government
policies persist to depress housing demand and transaction volumes, real estate may lack further
62 1 P a g e
capital required to develop their current landbank. These lands can potentially be confiscated as
idled land or developers may get capital by selling their existing unit inventory at a lower price
that will reduce their profit margins. While a large scale confiscation of idle land is unlikely as
the goal of Chinese government is to encourage more housing supply rather than to bankrupt the
developers, it is probable to set examples on a few companies for the industry.
Sino-Ocean Minmetals Country
Company Greentown SRE Land KWG CR Land SOL R&F Agile Shimao Glorious Land Garden COLI Renhe
Ticker 3900 HK 1207 HK 3377 HK 1813 HK 1109 HK 272 HK 2777 HK 3383 HK
2009 figures (currency) RMB HK$ RMB RMB HK$ RMB RMB RMB
Revenue (m) 8,727 2,831 8,824 4,267 16,601 6,758 18,196 13,331
Gross profit (m) 2,312 1,237 2,657 1,616 5,939 3,529 5,750 4,954
Net income (m) 1,012 785 1,582 720 4,409 2,673 2,900 1,865
Short-term debt (m) 10,522 1,065 8,828 2,696 2,001 1,988 4,183 2,867
Long-term debt (m) 21,295 9,506 21,986 7,783 32,355 12,668 24,014 13,702
Total debt (m) 31,817 10,571 30,814 10,479 34,356 14,656 28,197 16,570
Total debt/ Gross profit 13.8 8.5 11.6 6.5 5.8 4.2 4.9 3.3
Total debt / Net income 31.4 13.5 19.5 14.6 7.8 5.5 9.7 8.9
Figure 5.1 Debt level of Chinese Real Estate Developers
Source: Bloomberg, Samsung securities
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Bearish on China's overall economy
Investors who are bearish on China's overall economy can invest ETFs that are inversely
correlated with the underlying Chinese stocks. The ProShares UltraShort FTSE/Xinhua China 25
(FXP) is a levered ETF on shorting 25 Hong Kong-listed stocks. Figure 5.2 below shows that
the composition of FXP, which covers some of the most important sectors in China. This can be
an effective investment vehicle if an investor believes the existence of a housing bubble in China
and that there will be significant spillover effect.
63 1 P a g e
Financial 51.38%
Energy 25.16%
Communications 16.66%
Basic Materials 3.05%
Industrial 2.36%
Consumer, Cyclical 1.39%
Figure 5.2 Ultra Short FTSE China 25
Source: ProShares
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VI. Conclusion
The residential property market in China is undergoing a critical transition period. The
massive investment capital and bank loans into the real estate market have caused a strong surge
in asset prices within a short period of time. Due to the great regional disparities in real estate
developments and investments, national affordability numbers do not convey an accurate picture
on the local level. On a national level, while the supply outnumbered demand by 1.65x, housing
affordability ratio remained similar to international levels. Urbanization and strong growth in
national disposal income provided solid demand for housing. Even if China experiences a
decline in housing prices, the low mortgage loan to value ratio suggests sufficient home equity
cushion to avoid a potential downward spiral caused by distressed selling. At the local level,
different cities experience drastic differences in affordability. Among tier 1 cities, our analysis
shows that a 50 square meter unit in the suburban areas of Beijing and Shanghai are too
expensive for an average household. While Beijing is currently loaded with a 12 month
inventory buildup, the quick inventory turnover in Shanghai suggests the demand is still strong
and Shanghai is still undersupplied. Among tier 2 cities, Hangzhou exhibited tier I housing
prices and maintained one of the highest inventory buildup in the nation. On the other hand,
Chongqing displayed affordable housing prices backed by strong income growth and the
minimal inventory buildup suggests more potential upsides. As the regulatory environment
continues to be restrictive, the real estate market in China is expected to be driven by end users
in the near term. In fact, managing housing price by suppressing the demand will not be
sustainable.
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Affordable housing is the new frontier of China's residential property market by
increasing the supply particularly targeting at the lower income group. While the emergence of
affordable housing may impact close to 60% of the Chinese population, it also has different
implications and opportunities for existing property developers and new potential disruptors. As
displayed by leading players such as Vanke, most incumbent developers will avoid the center
light of the policies and retreat to other markets for the pursuit of generating similar profit
margins. Smaller developers such as BBMG can leverage the policy biases and expand its
market share. These low-end disruptors can participate in the affordable housing projects while
generating substantial margins. When incumbent players are retreating, low-end disruptors can
expand into these less desired markets and establish goodwill with governments and build their
landbanks at the same time.
Unlike the situation in US, the average household in China has large savings and little
debt. A potential trigger of the real estate bubble may lies in the huge debt piled up by most
property developers in China. There are currently limited investment tools available for bearish
investors. Investors who are bearish on China's real estate market can short the Chinese property
developers in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Bearish investors on the overall China's economy
can invest in ETFs such as FXP that short 25 Chinese listed companies in Hong Kong.
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